Introduction
There is a fundamental disconnect between empirical and theoretical work on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth. The basic insight of trade theory is that trade and protection influence the inter-sectoral allocation of resources. In the context of traditional static trade theory, protection (usually) reduces welfare, irrespective of what goods an economy is exporting and importing, since it reduces the output of the good in which the economy has a comparative advantage, and raises the output of the good in which the economy has a comparative disadvantage. Thus protection reduces the gains from trade, regardless of what goods are being protected.
However, theoretical models linking trade and growth typically specify asymmetries between sectors. In these models, it matters fundamentally what goods are being protected in an economy. For example, in Matsuyama (1992) the engine of growth is taken to be learning-by-doing in manufacturing, a phenomenon which is by assumption absent in agriculture. In this model, anything that increases the size of the agricultural sector is bad for growth. While tariff policy is not a focus of Matsuyama's paper, it might be supposed that in this case, agricultural protection should reduce growth, while industrial protection should raise it. 1 Alternatively, during the late 19th century, and at many other moments of history besides, urban wages far exceeded rural ones, suggesting that the marginal product of labour was lower in agriculture than in industry. Recent empirical work by authors such as Broadberry (1997, 1998) and Temin (2002) , building on earlier contributions by pioneers such as Edward Denison and Simon Kuznets (e.g. Denison 1968 , Kuznets 1957 , has emphasised that an important contribution to European growth over the past two centuries has been the reallocation of labour from agriculture to industry and services. 2 Temin argues that agricultural protection in countries like Germany (as well as the disruption to trade associated with the turmoil of 1914-45) slowed down this 1 In fact, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000, pp. 269-272) show that matters are slightly more complicated than this. In the case of a country protecting its manufacturing sector, the static welfare loss implied by the tariff increases over time as the manufacturing sector gets bigger. The implication is that growth rates are initially an increasing, and then a decreasing, function of the manufacturing tariff. 2 For a similar argument in the context of the United States, see Caselli and Coleman (2001) .
reallocation, and hence slowed growth. On the other hand, one might think that industrial protection should have speeded up the reallocation of labour to industry, hence raising growth. Admittedly, in a sufficiently long run perspective such inter-sectoral shifts represented a transition between two equilibria, and the growth they gave rise to was thus a disequilibrium phenomenon, rather than long run growth strictly speaking. In this respect, the argument is fundamentally different from Matsuyama's. Nonetheless, the time frame over which the reallocation took place was a very long one. Hence, if the rate of inter-sectoral labour reallocation speeded up or slowed down due to changes in tariff policy, this might show up in changed growth rates over the sort of short to medium run time periods that authors such as Clemens and Williamson (2004) , Harrison (1996) , O'Rourke (2000) and Vamvakidis (2002) have explored.
Theory thus suggests that the relationship between protection and growth depends on what is being protected. We are by no means the first people to have pointed this out, either explicitly or implicitly. Indeed, the models presented in Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggest that the relationship between trade and growth is fundamentally ambiguous, and it follows that the relationship between trade policy and growth will be ambiguous as well. As Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000, pp. 268-9) put it, paraphrasing
Grossman and Helpman, the general answer to the question "Does trade promote innovation in a small open economy?" is "It depends." In particular, the answer depends on whether the forces of comparative advantage push the economy's resources in the direction of activities that generate long-run growth (via externalities in research and development, expanding product variety, upgrading product quality, and so on) or divert them from such activities.
It is therefore striking that the vast majority of papers on the relationship between protection and growth (including classic papers such as Sachs and Warner 1995, Irwin 2001 Irwin , 2002 . What all these papers have in common, however, is a reliance on economy-wide average measures of protection. Surely we can do better than this. In particular, given the theoretical arguments outlined above, and given the fact that the late 19 th century was a period which saw many countries successfully make the transition from being predominantly agricultural to being predominantly industrial, we should surely be asking whether agricultural and industrial tariffs had the same impact on growth or not. This is especially true, since many rapidly industrialising countries during this period imposed high manufacturing tariffs, in an explicit attempt to promote their own industries. Did such tariffs promote or retard economic growth more generally? And did they have the same effect as agricultural tariffs, or the opposite effect?
The reason why scholars have not gone any further to date is simply that it is extremely difficult to obtain disaggregated indices of tariff protection. Average tariffs are easily calculated: all one needs to do is to divide total customs revenue, which governments have long collected, by the total value of imports. These data are readily available for a wide variety of countries. In order to obtain disaggregated tariffs, however, even for extremely broad aggregates such as 'agricultural goods' and 'manufactures', the researcher has to adopt one of two approaches. She can try to collect tariffs for individual commodities, and construct some sort of weighted average of these.
Here one immediately runs into the practical problem that different countries do not report tariffs for the same commodities, and indeed that the same commodities are not of equal relevance for different countries, given differences in the structure of production and trade.
In this paper we adopt a second approach, which is easier, but still difficult and time-consuming. This consists of dividing imports into the desired number of categories, in our case three: agricultural, industrial, and 'exotic'. The last category consists of goods such as coffee, tea and spices which were not produced in the countries concerned, and whose imports were taxed simply to provide governments with revenue. As will be seen, there are a number of issues which arise in choosing how to allocate goods between these three categories, and we have therefore tried a number of different specifications, to see if the judgement calls which we have had to make have materially influenced our results.
Obtaining such a breakdown of imports typically involved going back to countries' annual trade returns. Next, we calculated a similar breakdown of customs revenues into the same three categories, which involved consulting government returns giving revenues by tax source. Dividing customs revenues by tariffs yielded our average tariff data for these three commodity categories. The hope is that by obtaining such data, we will be better able to interpret the positive correlation between average tariffs and growth during this period, seeing whether it is completely spurious (e.g. driven by movements in 'exotic' revenue tariffs alone), or corresponds to underlying relationships that are in accord with the sorts of theoretical arguments mentioned above.
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There are two strands of recent research which are closely related to this paper.
The first is a very small number of papers exploring the relationship between the structure of protection and growth econometrically, using late 20 th century data. Nunn and Trefler (2004) calculate tariffs separately for skill-intensive and unskilled-labourintensive industries, and find that countries that protect the former grow more rapidly than countries that protect the latter. 4 The second is work by Tena Junguito (2008) , who adopts the Nunn-Trefler distinction between skill-intensive and unskilled-labourintensive industries, and provides cross-section regressions relating growth between 1870-5 and 1913 to tariffs in the 1870s. In the context of the late 19 th century, it would surely make more sense to look at the differing impacts of agricultural and industrial protection, and that is the approach taken here. Furthermore, given that tariffs changed so much in the late 19 th century, a purely cross-section approach misses a lot of the action. We therefore look at the relationship between tariffs and growth, exploiting variation in the data both across countries and over time. On the other hand, a particular concern of Tena's has been to separate out revenue tariffs from tariffs which might reasonably be taken to have been protective, and this is exactly mirrored in the approach adopted here.
Disaggregated tariff data
We use the same sample of countries as in O'Rourke (2000) . The ten countries considered are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The time period under consideration is . In order to calculate tariffs for agricultural goods, manufactures and 'exotics' we first collected annual data on customs revenues and imports for each commodity listed in the relevant financial or trade statistical report. Different countries broke down their customs revenues or imports in different ways, and the degree of disaggregation varied considerably. In Italy, both customs revenues and imports were broken down into 16 identical (later 19) commodity categories. By contrast, our Canadian import statistics broke down total imports into more than 200 categories, while our US customs revenue statistics broke down customs revenues into more than 250 categories. We collected all of these data for each country and each year. We then classified each of these commodity categories in the import statistics and the customs revenue statistics as belonging to either agricultural goods, manufacturing, or 'exotics', which allowed us to calculate total imports and total customs revenues for each of these three broad groups for every country and every year. given that they were counter-balanced by domestic excise duties on beer and spirits? In that case, maybe wine tariffs (and possibly beer and spirit tariffs as well) should be regarded as revenue tariffs, and thus be allocated to the 'exotics' category?
Resolving these issues satisfactorily seems difficult, if not impossible, particularly in the context of a panel dataset for ten different countries with different production structures and cross-price demand elasticities. It is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. We have therefore decided to allocate wine among the three categories in a number of different ways, and to see whether the choices we make affect the results. Our baseline assumption is that beer and spirits tariffs protected manufacturing, while wine tariffs protected agriculture in the five wine-producing countries in our sample (Australia, France, Germany, Italy and the United States). In the other five countries (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom), tariffs on wine are either regarded as being revenue tariffs, or as protecting industry. The first specification is closer in spirit to Irwin (1993) , while the second is closer in spirit to Nye (1991) , but we would not want to make too much of this distinction given that we are looking at a range of countries other than the United Kingdom, which was the focus of those two papers. 6 The primary purpose of this exercise is to see to what extent the allocation of wine tariffs matters for our results, and we ask for these two authors' indulgence in using their names to label these exercises.
Another issue that we had to confront was how to allocate tariffs on agricultural raw fibres, such as cotton, silk and jute. Although jute was grown in India, it seems sensible to treat jute tariffs as agricultural, on the grounds that they presumably protected domestic hemp production (just as tariffs on cane sugar protected beet sugar producers).
Similarly, we have treated tariffs on raw cotton and silk as agricultural in our baseline specification, and indeed both commodities were grown in particular countries in our sample (for example, cotton was grown in Australia and the United States, while silkgrowing was an important activity in Italy). We did however try allocating raw cotton and silk to the exotics category. Happily, this made no difference to our results, as results not reported here show.
Figures 1 though 3 give the baseline average tariff data. By definition, the two baseline specifications are identical for agricultural tariffs, as well as for manufacturing and revenue tariffs in the case of wine-producers. As can be seen, the two specifications also yield very similar results for manufacturing and revenue tariffs in non-wineproducing countries. Figure 1 shows that agricultural tariffs were particularly high in the United States and Canada, while tariffs were also at times quite high in Germany, Sweden, Italy and Norway. Consistent with the qualitative literature, tariffs were low and falling in Denmark, and were almost zero in the United Kingdom. Agricultural tariffs were relatively low in France as well. Figure 2 shows very high industrial tariffs in the three New World countries in our sample, with much lower tariffs in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom. Finally, Figure 3 shows particularly high revenue tariffs in Australia, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, while tariffs were considerably lower in Scandinavia and the United States. All three tariffs fluctuated considerably over time within individual countries. Agricultural and industrial tariffs were highly positively correlated in the sample as a whole: the correlation coefficient is 0.70 using either specification. On the other hand, the correlation between these two tariffs and revenue tariffs is negative, ranging between -0.23 and -0.34. (2000), while the tariff data were generated by us. We used a number of further control variables, including the primary product share of exports and railway density, which were taken from Clemens and Williamson (2004) , and we thank those authors for providing us with their data. Full details of all the data sources are provided in Appendix 1 and the notes to Table 1 . Since we have eight time periods, we can calculate growth rates between seven pairs of periods. Since we have data for ten countries, we thus have a small panel data set, with 70 observations in all. In all cases, we regress growth between two periods on average tariffs in the initial period.
Econometric results
Figures 4-6 show that while there is a positive bivariate correlation between GDP growth and both agricultural tariffs and manufacturing tariffs, the correlation between growth and revenue tariffs is close to zero. Of course, such simple bivariate correlations on their own tell us very little, although the fact that revenue tariffs are not positively correlated with growth is of some interest. Tables 2 and 3 thus regress per capita GDP growth on the initial agricultural, manufacturing and exotic tariffs, controlling for a variety of other variables. Tariffs are expressed as log(1+t), where t is the tariff rate. Table 2 includes wine tariffs with exotics in non-wine-producing countries, while Table 3 includes them with industrial tariffs. As can be seen, it makes no difference which specification you use. In all cases the equations include time dummies (coefficients not reported), and either country fixed effects (equations 1 through 4) or, as a robustness check, random effects (equation 5). Including country fixed effects allows us to take account of country-specific factors influencing growth rates either positively or negatively, in a consistent fashion across time. Being able to do so is of course one of the major advantages of panel techniques, as compared with the cross-sectional approach often used in the literature (Harrison 1996) . The time dummies are included so as to control for growth upswings and downturns that were common across countries. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.
Equation (1) in Tables 2 and 3 includes as additional controls the log of initial income, and growth in the capital-labour and land-labour ratios between the two periods.
The log of initial income is negatively related to subsequent growth. Growth in capitallabour and land-labour ratios have been found in the past to be important determinants of growth in the late 19 th century, a period of expanding frontiers and international factor flows (for a theoretical justification of the specification adopted here, see Taylor 1999 ).
The coefficient on both variables is positive, as expected, although the coefficient on the land-labour ratio is occasionally statistically insignificant at conventional levels. These findings are robust across all specifications.
More to the point, in the context of the present paper, agricultural tariffs are negatively related to growth in equation (1), while manufacturing tariffs are positively related to growth. The coefficients are big. For example, taking the coefficients in Table   2 , equation (1), a one standard deviation increase in agricultural tariffs is associated with a decline in growth rates of 0.37% per annum, or 26% of the mean annual growth rate in this sample of countries (1.45% per annum). A one standard deviation increase in industrial tariffs is associated with an increase in growth rates of 0.94% per annum, or 65% of the mean annual growth rate. On the other hand, while the coefficient on manufacturing tariffs is statistically significant, the coefficient on agricultural tariffs is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. These findings are also robust, in that they survive the addition of several other control variables in specifications (2) through (4), while the coefficient on the manufacturing tariff becomes even larger in the random effects specification (equation 5). 7 Moreover, the findings are by definition robust to the inclusion of country and time fixed effects (country random effects in equation 5). This is important, given Irwin's (2002) argument that the overall positive tariff-growth correlation during this period is being driven by the fact that certain countries, particularly those in the land-abundant New World, had good growth prospects and also imposed high tariffs, for completely unrelated reasons (in particular, they relied on tariffs as a source of government revenue). If this were the only factor driving the overall correlation, then one should find no relationship between average tariffs and growth once country fixed effects have been introduced into the equation. O'Rourke (2000) found that the average tariff-growth correlation increased when country fixed effects were introduced, and here we similarly find that there is a significant positive correlation between manufacturing tariffs and growth, controlling for country fixed effects. Indeed, the present finding is stronger than that presented in O'Rourke (2000), since the relationship between disaggregated tariffs and growth appears be robust to the inclusion of time dummies as well.
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The sign pattern of the tariff coefficients is consistent with theories of growth that argue that manufacturing is a source of growth in a way that agriculture simply is not.
The results are also consistent with the notion that economies could grow during this period by transferring labour from agriculture to industry, which implies that while industrial tariffs should speed up growth, agricultural tariffs should retard it.
Interestingly, there is no relationship between revenue or 'exotic' tariffs and growth, with the coefficients being extremely small and statistically insignificant. A spurious positive relationship between growth and overall average tariffs, driven by some need on the part of governments to raise revenues, might be expected to imply a positive correlation between revenue tariffs and growth, but that is not what these data show. The results in Tables 2 and 3 thus seem consistent with the empirical evidence presented by authors such as Williamson (2006) in favour of the "industry-carries-growth view" (p. 147), as applied to this period. In our view, these results make it more likely that the overall tariffgrowth correlation for this period was not some spurious artefact of the data, but rather reflected an underlying set of causal relationships linking trade, economic structure and growth. Table 4 provides two more specifications in an attempt to gain extra insight into these relationships. The first two columns test whether these results might be due to a mechanism considered in O' Rourke (2000) , namely that during late 19 th century recessions, prices tended to fall. This would lead to average tariff rates rising, since many tariffs were specified in specific rather than ad valorem terms during this period (Crucini 1994 , Irwin 1998 . Thus, average tariffs would be particularly high during recessions, when output was below its long run potential level, and subsequent growth rates might consequently be expected to be high. This could lead to a spurious positive correlation emerging between tariff rates and growth. We thus constructed very crude proxies for average 'specific' tariffs for each commodity category, by multiplying our tariff variable by the aggregate price level (i.e. the GDP deflator) of the economy in question. 9 As can be seen, the negative and positive relationships between agricultural and industrial tariffs on the one hand, and growth on the other, survive this transformation of the data, with the negative coefficients on agricultural tariffs now becoming statistically significant. We also (in results not reported here) interacted the tariff variables with the business cycle variable used in O'Rourke (2000), and found that manufacturing tariffs were more positively related to growth during booms than during busts. This is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effects uncovered above are due solely to some recession effect.
The third and fourth regressions in Table 4 explore whether these correlations were driven more by developments within Europe, or within the land-abundant societies of the New World (Australia, Canada and the United States in our sample). The negative relationship between agricultural tariffs and growth appears to be a New World phenomenon, with the two variables being essentially unrelated in Europe. On the other hand, the partial correlation between manufacturing tariffs and growth is positive in both Europe and the New World. While the effect is stronger in Europe, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal. The overall positive correlation between manufacturing tariffs and growth is not, it would appear, being primarily driven by developments in the settler economies of the New World, but by events in Europe as well.
Finally, Table 5 runs the same regressions as before, but takes as the dependent variable per capita industrial growth, rather than GDP growth. Since there are no available Canadian industrial output figures for this period, our sample was limited to nine countries and 63 observations. As can be seen, manufacturing tariffs were strongly and positively correlated with industrial growth during this period, and the size of the relationship is, as might be expected, larger than the size of the relationship between manufacturing tariffs and aggregate growth. On the other hand, there is no relationship between agricultural tariffs and industrial growth in this sample of countries.
Conclusion
While correlation is not causation, the evidence presented here is consistent with the argument that the overall positive tariff-growth correlation in the 19 th century was not spurious, but, rather, reflected underlying causal relationships that are consistent with particular economic theories. Manufacturing tariffs were positively related to growth, while agricultural tariffs were negatively related to growth (although the latter result is notably less robust than the former). This accords with a variety of theoretical arguments stressing the growth-promoting benefits of industry. Revenue tariffs were not related to growth at all: there is no evidence of a revenue-driven relationship between overall tariffs and growth emerging from these results. We stress again that these findings control not just for unobserved country-specific factors which influenced growth consistently across time, but for upswings and downswings in economic activity affecting all the countries in our sample. The positive relationship between manufacturing tariffs and growth was driven by European tariff experience just as much as, if not more than, by the New World, an important finding given the argument in Irwin (2002) that the overall tariffgrowth correlation was due to developments on the prairies.
There is a limit to how hard we can lean on these data, given how small a sample we have, but given that constraint, our results seem remarkably robust. It would clearly be of great interest to generate disaggregated tariff information for this period for a greater range of countries, not just so as to expand the degrees of freedom available to us, but more importantly to see if the relationships which have been uncovered here can be generalised to other regions of the world. The work of Clemens and Williamson (2004) suggests that this is not necessarily the case, since they found strong regional asymmetries in the relationship between average tariffs and growth: it could well be that what was true in our sample of more or less affluent economies was not true for poorer regions of the world as well.
Expanding the sample to more countries is particularly important since, as Jeffrey
Williamson (2006) presented here it is difficult to be sure.
As economic historians, we are comfortable with the notion that particular economic policies may have different effects across time and space, depending upon the technological, economic or institutional environment. We do not expect that the positive correlation between manufacturing tariffs and growth uncovered here will turn out to be a relationship that is generally valid. For example, it might be that for this period, protecting industry was equivalent to protecting 'expanding sectors', whereas industrial protection now typically protects 'declining sectors', with different effects. 10 We also stress that we are not making any welfare judgements in this paper. Many papers in the trade and growth literature derive positive relationships between protection and growth, but stress that this positive dynamic relationship has to be set against the static welfare losses implied by protectionism, and indeed that the relative sizes of these dynamic gains and static losses may vary dramatically over time. On a more mundane empirical note, as many countries found out during the 20th century, import substitution policies may give rise to an initial spurt of growth, which however eventually peters out when the limits of the internal market have been reached. Similarly, once all available agricultural labour has been reallocated to industry or services, this potential source of growth disappears.
By focusing on five-year periods, in common with much of the empirical literature, we may have been picking up the short to medium run impact of protection, rather than the longer run effects. There thus remains much work to be done on these issues, but we have to start somewhere, and establishing that particular relationships can be found in the data for one particular group of countries in one particular period is, we believe, a useful exercise.
Hopefully this paper has at least convinced the reader of one, crucial point.
Looking for correlations between average measures of protection and growth does not make a lot of sense. What you protect matters. Source: see Appendix 1 for details of how the tariff data were constructed. GDP growth, population growth and initial income were taken from Angus Maddison's website, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Capital stock growth, land growth and the business cycle indicator were taken from O' Rourke (2000) . The primary product share of exports and railway density were taken from Clemens and Williamson (2004) . The specific tariff data were constructed by taking the log of one plus (the tariff rate multiplied by the GDP deflator), with the latter being taken from O'Rourke (2000) . The import share of GDP was based on the data for nominal GDP detailed in O'Rourke (2000), and the following sources for nominal imports: Gammelgård (1985, Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1995 , Hansen (1974) , Davis (2004) , Butlin (1962) and from Norwegian data graciously provided by Ola Grytten.
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Appendix 1. The disaggregated tariff data

General:
We estimated average tariffs by dividing customs revenues by imports. Goods are categorized into three groups: agricultural, manufactured and 'exotic' goods.
We used the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) to assign the goods to different groups. We used the following specifications to calculate the three categories of tariffs, with the differences depending on how wine, raw cotton and raw silk are categorized:
Baseline 1: Agriculture, including raw silk, raw cotton, plus wine in Germany, France, Italy, Australia and USA, because they are wine producers. Exotics, including wine in the non-wine-producers (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom) Manufactures, including beer and spirits Baseline 2: Agriculture, including raw silk, raw cotton, plus wine in Germany, France, Italy, Australia and USA, because they are wine producers. Exotics Manufactures, including beer and spirits, and wine in the nonwine-producers (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom)
In the few cases where the overall figures for imports or customs revenues exceed the sum of the individual goods reported, we increased the totals for our three categories proportionally so that they summed to the correct total. Imports or customs revenues classified as "others" or "other goods" were proportionally divided between our three categories.
Below we give country-specific details of how we classified particular commodities, other than beer, spirits and wine. '. Folde (1989) also provides tariff rates for beer and spirits for 1872. Under the assumption that tariff rates did not change and that the import shares of wine, beer and spirits as well as the total share of beverages in total imports were equal to the ones in 1890 it is possible to approximate the shares of customs revenues and imports for wine, beer and spirits. Until 1895 tariffs were calculated using customs revenues divided by imports. After 1895
we know the tariff rates levied on different commodities. We calculate the (tradeweighted) average tariff rate for each category and multiply it by the share of dutiable imports in total imports for that category. For the years in which we calculate tariff rates using custom revenues divided by imports, imports contain values for wine, beer and spirits. In the customs revenues only wine appears. Furthermore, in the years from 1895
to 1914 there is a tariff rate for wine, but none for spirits and beer. No duties on beer and spirits appear, in either the early years or the later, although both sets of statistics are quite detailed, and there is no category such as 'drinks' which might cover beer and sprits. Thus it seems acceptable to assume zero tariff rates for spirits and beer.
Imports classified as agriculture (-1895):
Barley; bed feathers; beef skins; bone meal; bowels; bran; bristles; butter; calfskins;
calves; cattle; caviar; cellulose; cheese; clover seeds; cork; cotton scrap; dried fish; dried fruits; dried nuts; eggs; feathers; firewood; fish oil; flax; floret silk; flour and other mill products; flowers; fresh fish; fruits; fruits and berries; fur; gallnut; goats and sheepskins without hair; grape; grass seeds; hair; hemp; herring; honey; hoops; horses; jute; lard; linen seed; linen oil; logs; maize; malt; meat; meat extract; oilcake (fodder); olive oil; olive oil in barrels; oats; oxen; oysters; peanuts; pigs; poppy seeds; potatoes; poultry; rapeseed; raw cotton; raw hares and rabbit skins; raw materials for baskets; raw sheep, lamb and goatskins; raw silk; resin; rice; rye; saccarose; sesame; sheep; sheep wool; silk;
skin and fur for leather; straw; straw yarn; suckling pig; sugar; syrups and molasses;
